Outbound Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Motivation and Domestic Employment by Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) by Hong, Eunsuk et al.
 1 
This is the version of the article accepted for publication in Journal of International Management published by 
Elsevier: https://www.journals.elsevier.com/journal-of-international-management/  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/30009  
Published under: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/  
 
Outbound Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Motivation  
















School of Finance and Management 
SOAS University of London 
Thornhaugh Street, Russell Square, London WC1H 0XG 
Tel: (44) 20 7898 4564 
Fax: (44) 20 7898 4089 
E-mail: e.hong@soas.ac.uk 
 
In Hyeock (Ian) Lee** 
Department of Management 
Quinlan School of Business, Loyola University Chicago 
16 E. Pearson St., Chicago, IL 60611 
Tel: (312) 915-7656 




Department of Management 
The Chinese University of Hong Kong 
Shatin, N.T., Hong Kong 
Tel: (852) 3943-7636 
Fax: (852) 2603-5104 
E-mail: makino@baf.msmail.cuhk.edu.hk 
                                                 
 This work is equally contributed by authors, who are alphabetically ordered. 
 Corresponding author 
 2 
 
Outbound Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Motivation  
and Domestic Employment by Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study investigates whether and how outbound foreign direct investment (FDI) boosts or 
reduces domestic employment by multinational enterprises (MNEs). Based on analyses of a 
firm-level sample of 18,252 subsidiary-year cases of Japanese MNEs in 59 countries from 1996 
to 2010, the findings indicate that outbound FDI motivated by (1) market seeking for scale and 
scope expansion, (2) natural resource seeking, or (3) strategic asset seeking tends to serve as a 
“strategic complement” that enhances domestic employment by MNEs. However, outbound FDI 
motivated by (4) market seeking associated with declines in domestic demand or (5) labor 
resource seeking tends to act as a “strategic substitute” that reduces domestic employment by 
MNEs. The implications for theory, practice, and policymaking are discussed. 
 
Keywords: Outbound FDI, domestic employment, strategic substitute, strategic complement, 
FDI motivations, Japanese MNEs 
 
 3 
Outbound Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Motivation  
and Domestic Employment by Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) 
 
1. Introduction 
Scholars have long debated the relationship between outbound foreign direct investment (FDI) 
by multinational enterprises (MNEs) and the MNEs’ employment of domestic personnel. Yet 
despite five decades of debate, the empirical results remain inconclusive (Lipsey & Weiss, 1981; 
Head & Ries, 2004). Some studies find that outbound FDI and domestic employment are 
substitutable and have a negative relationship (e.g., Yeaple, 2003; Becker et al., 2005; Kokko, 
2006). Other studies find a complementary, positive relation between outbound FDI and 
domestic employment (e.g., Hijzen, Inui, & Todo, 2007; Becker & Muendler, 2008; Federico & 
Minerva, 2008; Desai, Foley, & Hines, 2009). In addition, numerous studies report mixed results 
that are conditional on firm, country, or industry variations (e.g., Mariotti, Mutinelli, & Piscitello, 
2003; Head & Ries, 2004; Chen & Ku, 2005; Harrison & McMillan, 2007; Konigs & Murphy, 
2006; Ekholm, Forslid, & Markusen, 2007; Debaere, Lee, & Lee, 2010; Mitra & Ranjan, 2010; 
Hijzen, Jean, & Mayer, 2011; Driffield, Pereira, & Temouri, 2017). 
These inconsistent findings suggest an interaction between two opposite effects that 
outbound FDI can have on domestic employment levels. On the one hand, an MNE’s outbound 
FDI may replace its domestic employees with new employees hired by their foreign affiliates 
(Mariotti, Mutinelli, & Piscitello, 2003; Greenaway & Kneller, 2007; Federico & Minerva, 2008). 
This kind of replacement typically happens when MNEs engage in a “vertical FDI,” especially a 
labor-seeking FDI into a developing country. In this kind of FDI, the labor-intensive aspects of 
an MNE’s domestic production are transferred to foreign subsidiaries (Blomström, Fors, & 
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Lipsey, 1997; Fors & Kokko, 2001), resulting in reductions of the MNE’s domestic employees. 
On the other hand, an MNE’s outbound FDI may generate more domestic employment due to 
expanded operations (Lipsey, 1994). This outcome typically happens when MNEs engage in a 
“horizontal FDI,” especially a market-seeking FDI, into an established foreign market where the 
MNE expands its production base and global market access into developed countries. As 
horizontal FDI requires an MNE to boost its initial input for the expanded operations (Helpman, 
Melitz, & Yeaple, 2004; Greenaway & Kneller, 2007), this initiative results in an increase of 
long-term outputs. Therefore, horizontal FDI can increase subsequent domestic employment to 
satisfy both the increased output demand (Ekholm, Forslid, & Markusen, 2007; Hijzen, Jean, & 
Mayer, 2011) and the increased demand for skilled headquarters services (such as management, 
financial, legal, R&D, and marketing) to support the foreign subsidiary operations (Fors & 
Kokko, 2001; Mitra & Ranjan, 2010). In essence, the literature on international economics shares 
a general consensus that a vertical FDI tends to reduce domestic employment, whereas a 
horizontal FDI tends to increase domestic employment.   
One critical unresolved issue in current discussions on the relationship between outbound 
FDI and domestic employment is that the literature is preliminarily based on country-level 
aggregate data, and these data have not effectively addressed the impact of firm heterogeneity. 
Although the importance of firm heterogeneity has recently been recognized in the literature on 
international economics (Helpman, Melitz, & Yeaple, 2004; Bernard, Redding, & Schott, 2007), 
many researchers have only just begun to examine the ways that firm heterogeneity can affect 
the flow of FDI and its outcomes. Also, the literature on international business has traditionally 
regarded FDI from a strategic management point of view, in which firms are assumed to possess 
heterogeneous resources, capabilities, and motivations to engage in FDI. However, this literature 
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has not yet provided clear insights into under which conditions MNEs can enhance societal 
welfare, such as domestic employment, through FDI. 
In this study, we argue that firm heterogeneity can provide additional explanatory power 
regarding the impact of outbound FDI on domestic employment beyond the conventional 
“vertical-horizontal” FDI dichotomy. Specifically, we argue that MNEs have specific strategic 
motivations for FDI, determined through searching for optimal configurations of firm-specific 
advantages (FSAs) and country-specific advantages (CSAs). These motivations, which include 
market seeking, labor resource seeking, natural resource seeking, and strategic asset seeking, 
integrate FSA configurations (exploitation vs. exploration) with CSA configurations (home vs. 
host countries) to guide outbound FDI effects. Therefore, the goal of this study is to provide a 
more nuanced set of predictions regarding the effects of outbound FDI on domestic employment 
from the perspective of firm heterogeneity. As such, we attempt to answer the following key 
research questions. (1) Do MNEs’ heterogeneous motivations for launching outbound FDI 
(resulting in the establishment of foreign subsidiaries) directly affect their levels of domestic 
employment? (2) Which motivations for FDI strategically complement or substitute for an 
MNE’s domestic employment as the firm develops parent-subsidiary relationships? We apply the 
basic concepts of strategic “complements” vs. “substitutes” to indicate a potential 
interrelatedness between two strategic decisions by competing firms. If a strategic decision by 
Firm A enhances (or discourages) the same component of Firm B’s strategy, then these two firms’ 
decisions are called strategic complements (or strategic substitutes, respectively) (Bulow, 
Geanakoplos, & Klemperer, 1985). Applying these concepts to our research setting, we argue 
that an outbound FDI motivation and a related domestic employment decision are strategic 
complements (or substitutes) for each other if the specific outbound FDI motivation for 
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establishing foreign subsidiaries increases (or decreases) domestic employment by the parent 
MNE. 
These research questions arise from theoretical observations regarding two distinct but 
interrelated strategic decisions that MNEs face regarding their international investments. First, 
MNEs make outbound FDI decisions that involve self-selecting behavior, triggered by specific 
motivations for outbound FDI projects. Second, the MNEs make simultaneous decisions 
regarding their (human) resource allocations between parent MNE and foreign subsidiary 
employment. The initial decision to engage in outbound FDI is critical for an MNE, because this 
decision determines whether the firm will maintain a shallow integration with foreign markets 
through exports alone or become deeply integrated into foreign contexts through launching direct 
investment projects. Therefore, we consider the initial motivation for investment as the main 
reason for direct foreign entry, as this motivation has the strongest impact on the headquarters-
subsidiary structure of an MNE, including its human resource allocations between home and 
foreign operations. To reflect this theoretical decision structure in our empirical setting, we 
construct a simultaneous equation model (SEM) with a system of two equations (i.e., one 
equation for parent MNE employment, and the other for subsidiary employment). Then we 
estimate the resulting system using three-stage least squares (3SLS) regressions, with the FDI 
motivation as a key independent decision variable. 
We tackle our research questions using a comprehensive dataset on the FDI of Japanese 
MNEs with established overseas subsidiaries. We use Japanese MNEs and their subsidiaries for 
two reasons. First, Japan has suffered from severe economic downturns over the past decade, 
which have caused great debates over whether outbound FDI by Japanese MNEs affects the 
home economy positively or negatively (Kambayashi & Kiyota, 2015). Due to the urgent 
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relevance of this issue in the Japanese context, a series of both conceptual and empirical studies 
has been conducted, yielding mixed findings (e.g., Branstetter, 2006; Lipsey, Ramstetter, & 
Blomström, 2000; Todo, 2011). This ambiguity has led to calls for more fine-grained studies 
based on larger samples. A second reason to focus on Japanese MNEs is that the Toyo Keizai 
dataset now provides the best available information on Japanese MNEs and their subsidiaries. 
This dataset contains a wide range of subsidiary-level information on Japanese MNEs, including 
the purposes for overseas establishments and other basic financial indices. The 
comprehensiveness and accuracy of this dataset has been acknowledged in previous empirical 
studies (e.g., Beamish, Delios, & Makino, 2001). Through the extensive use of these firm-level 
FDI data, we can better understand the strategic relationships between outbound FDI motivations 
and MNE home-country employment, which is a pressing question in the international business 
(IB) community.1  
This study unfolds as follows. In the next section, we propose a conceptual framework 
with hypotheses to be tested. Next, we discuss our empirical research design in detail. Then we 
present our empirical results to test the proposed hypotheses. We conclude with discussions of 
our findings; the theoretical, managerial, and policy implications; and the limitations of this 
study in relation to future research. 
 
2. Conceptual framework and hypotheses  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 ---------------------------------- 
                                                 
1 Although the Japanese FDI dataset is comprehensive, it does not yet provide information on the compositions or 
changes of diverse employment groups (e.g., managerial vs. blue-collar jobs) hired by Japanese MNEs in their 
headquarters and subsidiaries. This limitation confines the main criteria of this study to the total counts of 
employees hired by Japanese MNEs. 
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In developing our hypotheses, we use Dunning’s (1998) FDI motives as our overarching themes 
regarding the FSAs (firm-specific advantages) and CSAs (country-specific advantages) of MNEs 
(Rugman, 1981, 2005; Rugman & Verbeke, 2001, 2004a), as illustrated in Figure 1. Also, we 
connect each of Dunning’s (1998) FDI motives to the various combinations between FSAs and 
CSAs. The horizontal axis in Figure 1 indicates whether the MNEs are motivated to exploit or to 
explore firm-specific assets for conducting outbound FDI (Makino, Lau, & Yeh, 2002). The 
firms may be motivated to simply transfer their already-existing internationally transferrable 
FSAs to foreign subsidiaries in host countries (i.e., FSA replication), or they may attempt to 
expand/develop their current FSAs to conduct better business in host countries during the course 
of FSA transfers (i.e., FSA upgrading). Otherwise, they may be motivated to seek opportunities 
for creating new location-bound FSAs in host countries through entrepreneurial foreign 
subsidiaries (i.e., new FSA creation).   
The vertical axis of Figure 1 represents the two main kinds of motivation MNEs have for 
seeking CSAs from their host countries (i.e., host CSAs), namely to either complement their 
current home CSAs or to substitute for them. When MNEs are motivated to seek host CSAs to 
complement their current home CSAs, they use their home CSAs (e.g., pools of increasing 
domestic customer bases, access to natural resources, or availability of knowledge/technological 
resources in their home country) as platforms to further explore additional host CSAs (e.g., 
expanded customers/markets, foreign endowments of scarce natural resources, or knowledge 
clusters/sophisticated local firms in their host countries) from expanding their business 
operations abroad. When MNEs are motivated to seek host CSAs to substitute for their home 
CSAs, they aim to cultivate new sets of country-specific resources from foreign countries they 
have difficulty securing within their home country (e.g., a new pool of foreign 
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customers/markets, access to cheaper and better labor forces, or the generation of new 
scientific/marketing knowledge in their host countries). In such situations, MNEs commonly 
move their domestic functional operations to host countries, and substitute new host CSAs for 
their declining home CSAs. 
 
2.1 Market seeking as expansion 
With market-seeking FDI for the purpose of expansion (i.e., Cell I of Figure 1), the aim is to 
replicate an MNE’s internationally transferrable FSAs in foreign markets and expand its business 
by leveraging new access to foreign customer bases (i.e., additional host CSAs) to complement 
the firm’s current domestic customers (i.e., current home CSAs). Such efforts commonly result 
in increased domestic employment by MNEs, through either increased production volumes (i.e., 
scale expansion) or increased ranges of products and services (i.e., scope expansion). Ghemawat 
(2003) highlights the importance of FSA replication, whereby MNEs exploit market similarities 
across multiple foreign countries, leading to economies of scale and increased scope of common 
activities. MNEs that perform this kind of FDI basically replicate their existing FSAs in foreign 
markets to serve additional foreign customers that MNEs pioneer using their expanded foreign 
operations. Exploitation of such replicated advantages helps the MNEs to become more 
competitive in the world market and to generate additional demand for their final outputs (Lipsey, 
1994). As such, expansions of both scale and scope require greater coordination and control over 
geographically dispersed activities. These kinds of expansion require the extension of functions 
such as R&D, marketing, and planning, which are typically centralized at the HQ level 
(Blomström, Fors, & Lipsey, 1997; Mariotti, Mutinelli, & Piscitello, 2003). Consequently, the 
MNEs need to hire more employees at home to support the expanded market opportunities 
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gained through these extended functions. In such cases, outbound FDI and domestic employment 
levels can strategically complement each other. 
 
Hypothesis 1: An MNE’s outbound FDI, when motivated by market seeking to enable expansions 
of market scale or scope, will positively affect the MNE’s domestic employment levels.  
   
2.2 Market seeking as replacement 
In other situations, MNEs may need to explore new market opportunities in foreign countries to 
compensate for declines in domestic demand. In such situations, an MNE’s process of transfer, 
exploitation, and/or replication of its FSAs may be subject to home country-specific domestic 
circumstances (Buckley et al., 2007; Lu, Liu, & Wang, 2011), such as domestic industry life 
cycles. According to industry life-cycle theory, domestic demand in a new industry typically 
begins at the introduction stage, and as domestic markets for the new industry mature, they may 
increase rapidly at the growth stage, after which they eventually decline (Klepper & Graddy, 
1990; Jovanovic & MacDonald, 1994; Klepper, 1997). When an MNE’s industrial sectors reach 
the last stages of the industry life-cycle in their home country, the firm may have to cultivate new 
customers in foreign countries to compensate for the decline in domestic customers.  
Market-seeking FDI associated with declining domestic demand (i.e., Cell IV of Figure 1) 
is typically aimed to replicate an MNE’s internationally transferrable FSAs in foreign markets. 
This effort involves finding new foreign customers (i.e., new host CSAs) to substitute for the 
MNE’s declining domestic markets (i.e., current home CSAs). This type of initiative often 
results in decreased domestic employment by MNEs, because the replacement of declining 
domestic markets with new foreign markets is commonly accompanied by the restructuring 
transfer of the MNE’s production processes from the home to the host countries. This 
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phenomenon is especially prevalent when a traditional fixed-market assumption is imposed on an 
MNE’s foreign operations (Lipsey, 1994). According to this assumption, an MNE’s outbound 
FDI does not expand its efficient production frontiers outward, and given the decline of domestic 
markets, the MNE needs to secure new foreign customers to replace the declining numbers of 
domestic customers if it is to remain competitive and profitable. This argument implies that 
outbound FDI and domestic employment are strategic substitutes for each other under the 
condition of declining domestic demand. Therefore, when MNEs conduct market-seeking FDI 
associated with declining domestic demand, home country-specific circumstances may 
negatively moderate the relationship between market-seeking FDI and domestic employment 
levels as proposed in the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2: An MNE’s outbound FDI, when motivated by market seeking to replace domestic 
customers with foreign customers, will negatively affect the MNE’s domestic employment levels 
under the condition of declining domestic demand.   
 
2.3 Labor resource seeking 
Labor-resource-seeking FDI (i.e., Cell V of Figure 1) aims to sustain an MNE’s internationally 
transferrable production efficiency by acquiring cheaper and/or better new production factors, 
such as labor forces in foreign countries (i.e., new host CSAs) to substitute for inefficient 
domestic labor forces (i.e., current home CSAs). Labor-resource-seeking FDI reduces domestic 
production as a consequence of relocating the production base to foreign countries, and therefore 
such investment negatively affects the MNE’s domestic employment (Kotabe, 1989). This 
phenomenon becomes more prominent when the labor-resource-seeking FDI is expedited by 
export-replacing operations in the host countries, as the export-replacing outbound FDI 
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strategically replaces the MNE’s indigenous production with outputs produced in host countries 
(Ekholm, Forslid, & Markusen, 2007). Such a strategy can also encourage imports back to the 
MNE’s home country, resulting in the further reduction of domestic employees for the MNE. 
Therefore, when MNEs conduct labor-resource-seeking FDI, the MNE’s domestic employment 
levels may be affected negatively. 
 
Hypothesis 3: An MNE’s outbound FDI, when motivated by labor resource seeking, will 
negatively affect the MNE’s domestic employment levels.    
 
2.4 Natural resource seeking 
Natural-resource-seeking FDI (i.e., Cell II of Figure 1) aims to sustain an MNE’s internationally 
transferrable FSAs in foreign markets by leveraging new access to foreign endowments of scarce 
natural resources. Such investments serve to create local bases for mining or refining natural 
resources in foreign countries (i.e., new host CSAs) to complement the MNE’s current domestic 
production factors (i.e., current home CSAs). As natural resources are immobile across countries, 
MNEs can reduce transaction costs by internalizing scarce natural resources through outbound 
FDI (Buckley & Casson, 1976). Also, an MNE’s upstream activities (i.e., sourcing of natural 
resources) are vertically linked to its downstream activities (i.e., production or sales of natural-
resource-intensive products), and therefore a greater commitment to natural-resource-seeking 
FDI leads to greater expansion of business operations in both the MNE’s home and host 
countries. This expansion requires a greater coordination and control over geographically 
dispersed activities, operating under the vertically integrated value chains of the MNEs. Hence, 
such natural-resource-seeking FDI may strategically complement an MNE’s domestic 
employment decisions, resulting in increased domestic employment. These arguments lead us to 
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suggest that when MNEs conduct natural-resource-seeking FDI in foreign countries, it may 
positively affect the MNE’s domestic employment levels. 
 
Hypothesis 4: An MNE’s outbound FDI, when motivated by natural resource seeking, will 
positively affect the MNE’s domestic employment levels.    
 
2.5 Strategic asset seeking 
Strategic-asset-seeking FDI (i.e., Cells III and VI of Figure 1) aims to create new FSAs through 
acquiring knowhow and technology that are available in foreign countries, but not in the MNE’s 
home country (i.e., FSA exploration). MNEs can create new FSAs either by complementing their 
home-based knowledge with that available in their host countries (i.e., Cell III of Figure 1) or by 
cultivating new knowledge that is unavailable in their home countries (i.e., Cell VI of Figure 1). 
The first type of FSA exploration involves strategic-asset-seeking FDI by undertaking home 
base-exploiting R&D activities (Kuemmerle, 1997). In this type of FDI, MNEs commonly strive 
to remain responsive to the context of their host country markets through the creation of new 
location-specific scientific or market-related knowledge as they utilize their home-based 
knowledge creation as a basis for business development in host countries. The second type of 
FSA exploration, on the other hand, involves strategic-asset-seeking FDI with the aim to replace 
weak home-based knowledge with new foreign knowledge generated in host countries. In this 
type of FDI, MNEs build their foreign R&D capabilities in host countries to augment their weak 
home-based innovation and production activities (Kuemmerle, 1997). Both the home-base-
exploiting and home-base-augmenting forms of strategic-asset-seeking FDI are likely to result in 
an increase in domestic employment for MNEs, because parent MNEs need to provide 
headquarter (HQ) services to their foreign subsidiaries to be combined with knowledge of the 
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subsidiaries (Ibarra-Caton & Mataloni Jr, 2018). In addition, such strategic asset seeking 
enhances the knowledge creation process across national borders, which typically fuels an 
MNE’s growth through a balanced sequence of knowledge development, use, acquisition, and 
absorption (Rugman & Verbeke, 2004b).  
In support of these arguments, some studies suggest that strategic-asset-seeking FDI 
expands an MNE’s knowledge base and its opportunities for new business generation (Li et al., 
2016; Yoo & Reimann, 2017; Fu, Hou, & Liu, 2018), which in turn helps the MNE grow and 
ultimately increase its domestic employment (Kotabe, 1989; Kotabe & Swan, 1994). Therefore, 
when MNEs conduct strategic-asset-seeking FDI in foreign countries, this initiative may 
positively affect the firms’ domestic employment levels. 
 
Hypothesis 5: An MNE’s outbound FDI, when motivated by strategic asset seeking, will 
positively affect the MNE’s domestic employment levels. 
    
3. Research design 
3.1 Data and sampling 
The primary data sources used in our empirical analyses compile information on the worldwide 
foreign subsidiaries established by Japanese MNEs. The data on Japanese parent MNEs are 
drawn from the NIKKEI Economic Electronic Databank System (NEEDS), and are collected by 
Japan’s Ministry of the Economy, Trade, & Industry (METI). The data on Japanese overseas 
subsidiaries come from the Toyo Keizai database service. After merging both of these data 
sources, we exclude all data concerning foreign subsidiaries with (1) two or more parent MNEs 
or (2) three or more investment purposes. This sampling procedure is followed to avoid potential 
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confounding effects.2 As we have access to the Toyo Keizai dataset until 2010, but the survey 
questionnaires for measuring investment purposes are inconsistent until 1995, we confine our 
study period to 15 years (1996–2010). Our dataset consists of an unbalanced panel with a sample 
of 3,592 subsidiaries that were established by 799 MNEs operating in 59 countries from 1996 to 
2010, which yields a total of 18,252 subsidiary-year cases. Due to missing values in some 
variables, 10,094 observations are used for the full sample and 8,712 observations are used for 
the subsample with majority equity ownership (≥ 50%) in foreign subsidiaries.3 Both samples are 
used in our subsequent regression procedure.4  
 
3.2 Dependent variable 
The main dependent variable, the domestic employment by MNEs, is the logged number of 
domestic employees in a Japanese MNE p at time t, denoted as . The secondary dependent 
variable, the size of outbound FDI, is the logged number of employees working for an MNE’s 
foreign subsidiary s at time t, denoted as . The secondary dependent variable is needed to 
address the potential endogeneity of subsidiary employment when estimating the main impact of 
outbound FDI motivation on the domestic employment by parent MNEs.   
 
3.3 Hypothesized variables 
                                                 
2 For example, when there are multiple parent MNEs investing in the same foreign subsidiary, it may not be clear 
which MNEs’ domestic employment levels are affected by a subsidiary investment motivation. In addition, when the 
same outbound FDI project has multiple motivations, the impacts of motivations that are expected to decrease 
domestic employment and of motivations that are expected to increase domestic employment by the parent MNEs 
may generate confounding effects, which are expected to grow more complex as the number of motivations for the 
same outbound FDI project increases. 
3 There are 1,382 observations with minority ownership (<50%), 2,179 observations with majority ownership (≥50% 
and <100%), and 6,533 observations with full ownership (=100%) in the total of 10,094 observations.  
4 As such, so long as multiple subsidiaries are established by MNEs as a part of their initial foreign entries using 




The Toyo Keizai database categorizes Japanese FDI into the 15 most commonly observed types 
of motivations. We construct 15 FDI motivation dummy variables (MD1–MD15) for all 
subsidiary-year cases, and classify them into six broad motivation categories based on the 
following theoretical framework: (1) Market-seeking FDI with domestic market expansion, (2) 
Market-seeking FDI associated with domestic demand decline, (3) Labor-resource-seeking FDI, 
(4) Natural-resource-seeking FDI, (5) Strategic-asset-seeking FDI (as illustrated in Figure 1), and 
(6) Other FDI motivations. We use the investment motivations at the time of each firm’s initial 
foreign market entry.5 Although we may intuit that the roles of subsidiaries can change over time 
as they develop, we consider the “initial” investment motivation as the main reason for foreign 
entry. This initial motivation also typically has the longest-lasting effect on the subsidiaries’ 
operations. 
Market-seeking FDI as domestic market expansion. The motivation category of 
“Market-seeking FDI with domestic market expansion” refers to overseas subsidiaries s of 
Japanese parent MNEs p at time t, when motivated to expand their domestic operations into 




). Four motivation dummies 
belong to this category. First, “Building international networks of distribution (MD1)” aims to 
expand distribution networks throughout the world following an expansion of vertical production 
chain networks. Theoretically, distribution is less fungible than production; although distribution 
is by definition location-specific, production can be set up anywhere worldwide (Anand & 
Delios, 2002). Second, “Market access (MD2)” aims to gain access to host-country local markets 
by establishing foreign sales subsidiaries (Dunning, 1998). Third, “Export to other countries 
                                                 
5 For those subsidiaries established in 1996 and later, we use the motivation of each subsidiary reported in its 
establishment year, and, for those subsidiaries established before 1996, we assume that each subsidiary’s first-
reported motivation in the survey indicates the initial motivation at the time of its establishment. 
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(MD3)” aims to promote customer-base expansion in third countries beyond an MNE’s current 
home and host country markets (Ekholm, Forslid, & Markusen, 2007; Hijzen, Jean, & Mayer, 
2011). Fourth, “Controls business of the area (MD4)” aims to establish regional headquarters in 
response to the creation of integrated regional economic blocks among multiple foreign 
countries. Such regional headquarters are responsible for the MNEs’ foreign operations in the 
integrated new regional markets, with a particular focus on regional sales and distribution 
(Buckley et al., 2003; Rugman & Verbeke, 2004a; Sukpanich & Rugman, 2007; Verbeke & 
Kano, 2016).   
Market-seeking FDI with domestic demand decline. The motivation category of 
“Market-seeking FDI with domestic demand decline” refers to overseas subsidiaries s of 
Japanese parent MNEs p at time t, when motivated to replace their existing domestic operations 





One motivation dummy and four interaction terms belong to this category. First, “Alliance with 
customers (MD5)” reflects the market-seeking FDI motivation of MNEs whose primary business 
is to serve their flagship-types of downstream MNE customers in proximity who decided to 
move into foreign countries (Rugman & D’Cruz, 2003; Makino, Beamish, & Zhao, 2004; Narula 
& Verbeke, 2015).6 Second, four interaction terms between the ratio of Japanese GDP by 
industry and each of the four motivation variables defined in the “Market-seeking FDI with 
domestic market expansion” aim to capture market-seeking FDI that is affected by Japanese 
MNEs’ reactions to declining Japanese markets. These variables are (i) MD1. Building 
international networks of distribution × Ratio of Japanese GDP by industry, (ii) MD2. Market 
                                                 
6 A good example of this motivation category may be that engine manufacturers must follow their final auto-makers 
to maintain their current alliance with them who established auto assembly plants in foreign countries. As such, 
engine manufacturers’ outbound FDI in this case is regarded as being motivated by the demand decline in their 
domestic market, because their direct customers have now moved to foreign countries. 
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access × Ratio of Japanese GDP by industry, (iii) MD3. Export to other countries × Ratio of 
Japanese GDP by industry, and (iv) MD4. Controls business of the area × Ratio of Japanese 
GDP by industry.     
Labor-resource-seeking FDI. The motivation category of “Labor-resource-seeking FDI” 
refers to overseas subsidiaries s of Japanese parent MNEs p at time t, when motivated to acquire 
low-cost labor forces by relocating their domestic production bases to foreign countries (
pstLaborMOT , ). Three motivation dummies belong to this category. First, “Labor intensity 
(MD6)” requires setting up or acquiring subsidiaries in foreign countries with lower real labor 
costs to replace home-country production of labor-intensive intermediate or final products (Fors 
& Kokko, 2001). Second, “Exports to Japan (MD7)” involves replacing domestic production of 
upward-value activities (e.g., intermediate components) in MNEs’ home country with outputs 
produced in their host countries (Ekholm, Forslid, & Markusen, 2007).7 Third, under the 
motivation of “Building international networks of production (MD8),” MNEs create value 
through the transformation of production inputs into demanded outputs across transnational 
space, which usually replaces some home country production stages (Hennart, 1991). 
 Natural-resource-seeking FDI. The motivation category of “Natural-resource-seeking 
FDI” refers to overseas subsidiaries s of Japanese parent MNEs p at time t, when motivated to 
mine and/or refine immobile natural resources available in foreign countries (denoted as 
pstsourceNaturalMOT ,Re ). The “Natural resources and materials (MD9)” dummy generally involves 
natural-resource-oriented firms aiming to sustain their FSAs by gaining access to immobile or 
scarce natural resource endowments in foreign countries (Dunning, 2000).   
                                                 
7 This form of outbound FDI typically takes place when domestic labor forces become too expensive to sustain 
MNEs’ competitive advantages in manufacturing industries. As such, MNEs relocate their production activities to 
foreign countries in search for low-cost labor forces therein, and they export cost-competitive foreign-manufactured 
outputs back to Japan from the host countries. 
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 Strategic-asset-seeking FDI. The motivation category of “Strategic-asset-seeking FDI” 
refers to overseas subsidiaries s of Japanese parent MNEs p at time t, when motivated to create 
new FSAs through either home-base exploiting or home-base augmenting R&D activities in host 
countries (denoted as pstAssetStrategicMOT , ). This category has two motivation dummies. The first is 
“Information gathering, royalty revenue (MD10),” in which MNEs collect information about 
local markets and technological knowledge in host countries (Knight & Liesch, 2002) and/or 
explore local demand for superior innovation capacity in host countries, leading to royalty 
income (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Rugman & Verbeke, 2001). Under the second motivation of 
“R&D (MD11),” MNEs aim to develop foreign R&D capabilities by exploring new knowledge, 
or by identifying highly skilled science and engineering talent in host countries (Cantwell, 
Dunning, & Janne, 2004; Lewin, Massini, & Peeters, 2009; Yoo & Reimann, 2017). 
 Other FDI motivations. The motivation category of “Other FDI motivations” refers to 
subsidiaries s of Japanese parent MNEs p at time t, when motivated to achieve various objectives 
that are not clearly categorized by the conceptual framework in Figure 1 due to their ambiguous 
effects on domestic employment by MNEs ( pstOthersMOT , ). Four motivation dummies belong to 
this category: (i) “Tax breaks for investments (MD12),” (ii) “Financing and currency hedging 
(MD13),” (iii) “Trade conflict (MD14),” and (iv) “Building new business (MD15).” As these 
four motivations are expected to change the opportunity costs for MNEs to conduct businesses in 
either their home or host countries (thus affecting the domestic employment levels of MNEs), 
these motivations are included as controls in our subsequent empirical estimations.  
 
3.4 Control variables 
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Our conceptual framework on the relationship among MNEs’ FDI motivations, FSAs/CSAs, and 
their impacts on domestic employment described in Figure 1 implies that domestic employment 
is determined not only by FDI motivations, but also by firm-specific (i.e., parent & subsidiary) 
and country-specific (i.e., home & host) factors. Hence, in addition to the four motivational 
controls introduced in the previous subsection, we use eight parent-, subsidiary-, home country-, 
and host country-specific variables to control for other major determinants of employment and 
FDI levels that are both theoretically and empirically verified in the previous literature. 
In terms of parent firm-specific characteristics, two factors are controlled. First, the size 
of an MNE’s foreign local network is measured by the total number of pre-existing overseas 
subsidiaries established by each Japanese MNE per host country h in a given year t ( ). 
Foreign firms with prior experience in a host country usually have more information about the 
local environment than first-time entrants, and such foreign experience provides parent MNEs 
with flexibility in managing their foreign subsidiaries (Makino & Delios, 1996; Shaver, Mitchell, 
& Yeung, 1997; Delios & Beamish, 2001; Fang et al., 2010). Second, we control for the parent 
MNE’s innovation capacity, calculated by dividing R&D expenses by operating revenues in the 
Japanese parent MNE p at time t ( ). The parent MNE’s subsidiaries are embedded in 
intra-corporate knowledge networks, and the parent MNE’s innovation capacity is one of the 
important sources of knowledge for its subsidiaries within such networks (Gupta & Govindarajan, 
2000; Delios & Beamish, 2001; Mudambi & Navarra, 2004; Fang et al., 2010). In terms of 
foreign-subsidiary-specific characteristics, we control for each subsidiary’s performance by 
measuring the logged amount of revenue earned by foreign subsidiary s at time t ( ) 





In terms of home-country-specific characteristics, two factors are assessed. First, the 
Japanese domestic market structure is measured by calculating the ratio of Japanese GDP by 
industry i over 22 sectors at time t ( itIGDP ),
8 as each industry’s contributions to Japan’s GDP 
indicate the industrial dynamics of the Japanese economy during our study period (Dekle, 2002). 
Second, we control for Japan’s economic fluctuations during our study period by measuring 
annual unemployment rates in Japan at time t (𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡). We consider this factor because the 
national unemployment rate is widely recognized as an important indicator of economic and 
business cycles (Martin & Rogers, 2000).  
In terms of host-country-specific characteristics, three factors are set out. First, we 
control for the market size of each host country by measuring the logged GDP of host country h, 
in which a Japanese MNE invests at time t ( ). We control for market size because it 
indicates investment opportunities for MNEs that are looking for new markets or seeking to 
maximize returns on their investments (Head & Myer, 2004). Second, the geographic distance 
between Japan and a Japanese MNE’s host economy is measured as the great-circle distance in 
km between the capital city of Japan and that of each host country h, using longitude and latitude 
coordinates (𝐷𝐼𝑆ℎ). Distance can be either an impediment to or an incentive for FDI (Borrmann, 
Jungnickel, & Keller, 2005). On the one hand, distance can be an impediment to FDI, as 
managerial and transaction costs normally increase with distance. On the other hand, distance 
can be an incentive for FDI, as a means to avoid transportation costs and trade barriers through 
local production. Third, we use the measure of “rule of law,” as applied in the World Bank’s 
                                                 
8 The 22 industries are agriculture; forestry and fishing; mining; food products and beverages; textiles; pulp, paper, 
and paper products; chemicals; petroleum and coal products; non-metallic mineral products; iron and steel; 
fabricated metal products; machinery; electrical machinery, equipment and supplies; transport equipment; precision 
instruments; manufacturing, others; construction; electricity, gas, and water supply; wholesale and retail trade; 
finance and insurance; real estate; transport, and communications; and service activities. 
htGDP
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Worldwide Governance Indicators,9 as a means to control for heterogeneous legal institutions in 
host country h, in which Japanese MNEs invest at time t ( ). A host country with well-
established legal systems and institutions provides a level of stability that makes investors more 
willing to invest in that country (Globerman & Shapiro, 2002; Buchanan, Le, & Rishi, 2012). 
We construct the eight control variables with data from the World Economic Outlook 
Database of the International Monetary Fund for , from the Japan Statistical Yearbook for 
 and 𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡, and from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators for . 
We use data from the NIKKEI Economic Electronic Databank System for , and the Toyo 
Keizai data for  and . As we consider Japanese FDI projects across various 
industries and geographic regions during the 15-year period, we also include industry dummies 
of Japanese parent MNEs ( ), regional dummies of host countries ( )10, and yearly dummies 
( ) in our subsequent estimations.  
 
3.5 Empirical model and estimation method 
To investigate the relationship between outbound FDI and parent MNE domestic employment 
with an emphasis on the impact of FDI motivations, we first formulate the following equation: 
𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑝𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑂𝑇𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛,𝑝𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑀𝑂𝑇𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡,𝑝𝑠𝑡 +
 𝛽3𝑀𝑂𝑇𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟,𝑝𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑂𝑇𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒,𝑝𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑀𝑂𝑇𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡,𝑝𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑀𝑂𝑇𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠,𝑝𝑠𝑡 +
 𝛽7𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑠𝑡 +   𝛽8𝐺𝐷𝑃ℎ𝑡 +  𝛽9𝐼𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽10𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡 +   𝛽11𝐷𝐼𝑆ℎ +  𝛽12𝑅𝑜𝐿ℎ𝑡 +  𝛽13𝑁𝐸𝑇ℎ𝑡 +
 𝛽14𝑅&𝐷𝑝𝑡 +  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑟 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜖𝑝,𝑠,ℎ,𝑖,𝑟,𝑡               (1) 
                                                 
9 This indicator has a spread of -2.5 (i.e., low rule of law) to 2.5 (i.e., high rule of law). 
10 Host countries are categorized into seven regional dummies: Asia, Middle East, Europe, North America, Latin 









where 𝜖𝑝,𝑠,ℎ,𝑖,𝑟,𝑡 is an error term.  
 Equation (1) has a potential endogeneity issue between the domestic personnel levels of 
parent MNEs ( ) and the personnel levels of their foreign subsidiaries ( ) due to their 
interdependent connections. MNEs may make “simultaneous” decisions regarding the 
employment levels for both parent MNEs and foreign subsidiaries when they implement 
outbound FDI to achieve optimal allocations of human resources across national borders. To deal 
with this problem in our regressions, we specify the second equation for the determining 
employment by foreign subsidiaries to obtain an instrumental variable for the endogenous 
employment levels of foreign subsidiaries: 
𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑠𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑀𝑂𝑇𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛,𝑝𝑠𝑡 +   𝛽2𝑀𝑂𝑇𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡,𝑝𝑠𝑡 +
 𝛽3𝑀𝑂𝑇𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟,𝑝𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑂𝑇𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒,𝑝𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑀𝑂𝑇𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡,𝑝𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑀𝑂𝑇𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠,𝑝𝑠𝑡 +
 𝛽7𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑝𝑡 +   𝛽8𝐺𝐷𝑃ℎ𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐼𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽10𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡 +   𝛽11𝐷𝐼𝑆ℎ +  𝛽12𝑅𝑜𝐿ℎ𝑡 +   𝛽13𝑁𝐸𝑇ℎ𝑡 +
 𝛽14𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑠𝑡 +  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑟 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜖𝑝,𝑠,ℎ,𝑖,𝑟,𝑡               (2) 
To cope with the endogeneity of  and , we construct a simultaneous 
equation model (SEM) with a system of equations (1) and (2), and then estimate the system 
using three-stage least squares (3SLS) regressions,11 which combine instrumental variable (IV) 
techniques and generalized least square (GLS) estimators. The 3SLS achieves consistency 
through appropriate instrumentation and efficiency through optimal weighting. It also corrects 
for the correlation between the disturbances across the two equations (Greene, 2008, p. 407).   
  
                                                 
11 To satisfy the order condition for identification in the 3SLS estimation, we assume that the R&D capacity of 
parent MNEs ( ) in equation (1) will have a direct impact on domestic employment by parent MNEs, but only 
an indirect impact on employment by their overseas subsidiaries. Correspondingly, we assume that the sales 
performance of overseas subsidiaries ( ) in equation (2) will have a direct impact on the employment by 








Insert Tables 1 – 4 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
Tables 1 and 2 provide the descriptive statistics and correlations of the variables we use in our 
equation system, as introduced in the previous section. Tables 3 and 4 provide our empirical 
results from the 3SLS regressions using (1) our full sample and (2) those observations with 
majority equity ownership (≥ 50%) in foreign subsidiaries, respectively, to test Hypotheses 1–5. 
The empirical results are reported in three models, step by step, in each table. These models are 
the control only model (Model 1), the control and motivation dummy model (Model 2), and the 
control, motivation dummy, and interaction model (Model 3). Japanese overseas subsidiary 
employment levels (as presented in column 5 of Tables 3 and 4) are shown to positively affect 
parent MNE employment levels with statistical significance (β = 0.538 at p = 0.0001 for the full 
sample, and β = 0.558 at p = 0.0001 for ownership ≥ 50%), indicating that a 1% increase in the 
Japanese subsidiary’s employment is likely to increase the parent MNE’s overall home 
employment by 0.538% and 0.558%, respectively, with 99% confidence.12 However, as 
illustrated in the same column of both tables, when we factor in the different motivations for 
outbound FDI projects as revealed by Japanese MNEs, this conclusion may be premature or 
misleading. The direct effects of outbound FDI on Japanese MNEs’ domestic employment levels 
are heavily dependent on the specific motivations for the Japanese MNEs’ investments, which 
are affected by an optimal configuration of FSAs and CSAs for those MNEs. 
 First, when MNEs expand their business by leveraging new access to foreign customers 
to complement their current domestic customers (i.e., Market-seeking FDI with domestic market 
                                                 
12 When both the dependent and independent variables are logged variables in an econometric equation, the 
estimated coefficient represents elasticity between the two variables, with all other variables held constant. 
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expansion, in Cell I of Figure 1), such outbound FDI projects are shown to increase domestic 
employment by MNEs in Japan as those firms seek to serve the additional foreign customers 
gained from their expansion. Outbound FDI that aims to gain direct access to host-country local 
markets by establishing foreign sales subsidiaries adds extra demand to the MNEs’ current 
exploitation of their home markets (MD2: Market access, β = 0.268 at p = 0.0001 for the full 
sample, and β = 0.357 at p = 0.0001 for ownership ≥ 50%). Outbound FDI via the establishment 
of foreign sales subsidiaries that aim to serve neighboring foreign countries with market potential 
(MD3: Exports to other countries, β = 0.246 at p = 0.021 for the full sample, and β = 0.561 at p = 
0.0001 for ownership ≥ 50%) commonly generates greater demand for MNE outputs. When 
MNEs establish regional headquarters through outbound FDI to control their foreign businesses 
in specific areas, their main motive is to boost regional sales in economically integrated blocks 
(e.g., NAFTA, EU, ASEAN) by becoming insiders (MD4: Controls business in the area, β = 
0.542 at p = 0.008 for the full sample, and β = 1.154 at p < 0.0001 for ownership ≥ 50%). These 
empirical results imply that outbound FDI projects triggered by these three motivations are likely 
to increase Japanese MNEs’ home employment by 19.48% (MD2: Market access), 0.89% (MD3: 
Exports to other countries), and 0.70% (MD4: Controls business in the area), with either 99% or 
95% confidence for the full sample when evaluated at the mean value of each motivation.13 
These effects are enhanced to 26.02%, 2.08%, and 1.62%, respectively, with 99% confidence for 
the subsample with majority ownership. However, outbound FDI of Japanese MNEs aiming to 
expand their global distribution networks has no statistically significant effect on their domestic 
                                                 
13 From log 𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑥 + 𝑒 , (
𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑥
)/𝑦 =  𝛽1. By multiplying x on both sides and rearranging the resulting 






) =  𝛽1 ∙ 𝑥. As (
𝑑𝑥
𝑥
) always represents 1 when x is a dummy variable (i.e., x 
changes from 0 to 1), the percentage (%) change of y can be calculated as (
𝑑𝑦
𝑦
) ∙ 100 =  𝛽1 ∙ ?̅? ∙ 100 at the 
mean value of x. 
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employment levels (MD1. Building international networks of distribution, β = 0.181 at p = 0.240 
for the full sample, and β = 0.248 at p = 0.141 for ownership ≥ 50%). All of this evidence 
partially supports Hypothesis 1 that outbound FDI with a market-seeking motivation due to 
domestic market expansion is likely to be a strategic complement to domestic employment by 
MNEs. 
Second, when MNEs explore new foreign markets to substitute for declining domestic 
demand (i.e., Market-seeking FDI with domestic market decline, in Cell IV of Figure 1), such 
outbound FDI projects are shown to reduce the parent MNE’s overall home employment levels. 
In column 5 of Tables 3 and 4, outbound FDI following downstream customers by forming 
alliances with them significantly and negatively affects the domestic employment levels of 
Japanese MNEs (MD5: Alliance with customers in Japan, β = –0.449 at p = 0.0001 for the full 
sample, and β = –0.500 at p = 0.0001 for ownership ≥ 50%). These findings indicate that such 
outbound FDI is likely to reduce the parent MNEs’ home employment by 0.90% and 1.05%, 
respectively, with 99% confidence when evaluated at the mean value of FDI motivation.  
In the same column of both Tables 3 and 4, our regressions include the interaction terms 
between the ratio of Japanese GDP by industry, and each of MD1, MD2, MD3, and MD4, as the 
interaction terms presumably show negative and significant signs when outbound FDI projects 
with market-seeking motivation are conditioned by the MNEs’ reactions to declining domestic 
markets. Indeed, [MD2  Ratio of Japanese GDP by industry], [MD3  Ratio of Japanese GDP 
by industry], and [MD4  Ratio of Japanese GDP by industry] generate significantly negative 
coefficients, as shown in column 5 of Tables 3 and 4 (β = –0.016 at p = 0.0001, β = –0.023 at p = 
0.019, and β = –0.029 at p = 0.058, respectively, for the full sample, and β = –0.023 at p = 
0.0001, β = –0.042 at p = 0.0001, and β = –0.065 at p = 0.0001, respectively, for ownership ≥ 
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50%). These results imply that when Japanese MNEs are motivated to conduct market-seeking 
FDI under the home country-specific disadvantageous circumstances of declining domestic 
demand, such outbound FDI projects are likely to result in the decrease of the parent MNEs’ 
home employment by 0.15% (MD2: Market access), 0.21% (MD3: Exports to other countries), 
and 0.27% (MD4: Controls business in the area), with 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence, 
respectively, for the full sample, as the ratio of their participating industry in the Japanese GDP 
reduces by 1%.14 For the subsample with majority ownership, these effects become stronger at 
0.23%, 0.42%, and 0.64%, respectively, with 99% confidence. Although it is insignificant for the 
full sample, [MD1  Ratio of Japanese GDP by industry] still shows a significantly negative 
coefficient for the subsample of ownership ≥ 50% (β = –0.020 at p = 0.099). This result signifies 
that when Japanese MNEs undertake overseas investment with the motive of building 
international distribution channels to overcome downturns in their participating domestic 
industries, a 1% decrease in the share of the industry (in terms of Japanese GDP) is likely to 
result in a decrease of the MNE’s home employment by 0.20% with 90% confidence. In 
considering all of these results, we conclude that outbound FDI with a market-seeking 
motivation is likely to become a strategic substitute for domestic employment by MNEs under 
the disadvantageious condition of declines in domestic demand. These results support 
Hypothesis 2. 
                                                 
14 From log 𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑥1 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑥2 + 𝛽3 ∙ (𝑥1 ∙ 𝑥2) + 𝑒, where x1 is a motivational dummy and x2 is an 
industrial composition (%), (
𝜕𝑦
𝜕𝑥2
)/𝑦 =  𝛽2  +  𝛽3 ∙ 𝑥1. By multiplying x2 on both sides and rearranging the 






) =  𝛽2 ∙ 𝑥2  +  𝛽3 ∙ 𝑥1 ∙ 𝑥2, which indicates an elasticity between 
y and x2, when evaluated at certain values of x1 and x2. When outbound FDI projects are triggered by a certain 
motivation (i.e., x1 changes from 0 to 1), marginal changes in the elasticity can be calculated as 𝛽3 ∙ ?̅?2 at the mean 
value of x2. 
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Third, when MNEs internationalize to replace their inefficient domestic labor forces with 
new production factors from foreign countries (i.e., Labor-resource-seeking FDI, in Cell V of 
Figure 1), such outbound FDI projects are also shown to reduce the parent MNEs’ overall home 
employment levels. In column 5 of Tables 3 and 4, directly relocating the labor-intensive, home-
based production base to foreign countries with lower labor costs significantly and negatively 
affects the domestic employment levels of Japanese MNEs (MD6: Labor Intensity, β = –0.145 at 
p = 0.002 for the full sample, and β = –0.128 at p = 0.012 for ownership ≥ 50%). We interpret 
this result as indicating that such outbound FDI is likely to reduce the parent MNEs’ home 
employment by 1.39% and 1.22% for each sample with 99% and 95% confidence, respectively, 
when evaluated at the mean value of the motivation. Replacing domestic consumption of 
upward-value activities in the MNEs’ home country with outputs produced in their host countries 
(MD7: Exports to Japan) and establishing trans-border production networks with foreign 
manufacturing partners (MD8: Building international networks of production) both generate 
inconsistent signs of coefficients. However, these results are shown to be statistically 
insignificant. All of these results partially support Hypothesis 3 that labor-resource-seeking 
outbound FDI is likely to become a strategic substitute for domestic employment by MNEs. 
Fourth, when MNEs establish a local base for mining or refining immobile natural 
resources that are available in foreign countries as a means to complement their scarce domestic 
production factors (i.e., Natural-resource-seeking FDI, in Cell II of Figure 1), such outbound FDI 
projects are shown to increase the parent MNEs’ home employment levels. In the case of MNEs 
operating in natural-resource-intensive industries such as oil, gas, and energy, securing access to 
such scarce natural resources and materials in host countries is necessary for those MNEs to 
sustain their unique FSAs. Securing such access results in expanded business opportunities with 
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more employees hired at home. The results, shown in column 5 of Table 4, support this view 
(MD9: Natural resources and materials, β = 0.336 at p = 0.001 for ownership ≥ 50%). These 
findings indicate that this kind of outbound FDI is likely to enhance the levels of domestic 
employment by Japanese MNEs by 0.71% with 99% confidence, when evaluated at the mean 
value of the FDI motivation. These results partially support Hypothesis 4, predicting that 
outbound FDI with a natural-resource-seeking motivation is likely to serve as a strategic 
complement to domestic employment by MNEs. 
 Fifth, when MNEs internationalize to create new FSAs, either by complementing their 
home-based knowledge with that available in host countries or by cultivating new knowledge/ 
technological resources that are unavailable in their home countries (i.e., Strategic-asset-seeking 
FDI, in Cells III and VI of Figure 1), such outbound FDI projects are shown to boost MNEs’ 
domestic employment levels. The empirical evidence shown in column 5 of Tables 3 and 4 
partially supports the co-evolutionary relationship predicted by Hypothesis 5. Japanese foreign 
subsidiaries that are motivated to obtain relevant market and/or scientific information indirectly 
in host countries are shown to significantly and positively affect the home employment levels of 
Japanese MNEs (MD10: Information gathering, β = 0.311 at p = 0.0001 for the full sample, and 
β = 0.392 at p = 0.0001 for ownership ≥ 50%). As a result of such strategic-asset-seeking FDI 
activities, additional employees are hired at home to serve newly expanded business 
opportunities abroad. Specifically, these kinds of outbound FDI projects are likely to enhance the 
parent MNEs’ home employment levels by 5.82% and 7.68% with 99% confidence, respectively, 
for each sample when evaluated at the mean value of the FDI motivation. Although insignificant, 
conducting direct R&D (MD11:R&D) still shows positive coefficients in the same column of 
both tables. All of these results partially support Hypothesis 5 that outbound FDI with a 
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strategic-asset-seeking motivation is likely to serve as a strategic complement to domestic 
employment by MNEs.  
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
Table 5 summaries the aforementioned empirical estimation results per each of the five 
hypotheses put forward in this study. To guarantee the robustness of the empirical findings, we 
conduct four robustness tests with the sample of majority equity ownership (≥ 50%) in foreign 
subsidiaries, as reported in Table 6. First, it is important to see whether incorporating alternative 
time lags between the outbound FDI motivations and the MNEs’ domestic employment levels 
change our empirical findings. Therefore, we use (t+1), (t+2), and (t+3) lagged variables of the 
domestic employment levels in our regressions. Second, we use a subsample of the parent MNEs, 
namely those MNEs that have only one subsidiary for each host country, as a test to confirm that 
our main empirical results are not sensitive to the numbers of subsidiary networks established by 
the MNEs. Third, we conduct a robustness test with the subsample of Japanese foreign 
subsidiaries that have only one FDI motivation. Lastly, we use the system generalized method of 
moments (GMM) on the parent-firm employment equation (1) as an alternative to the 3SLS 
empirical model to confirm that our findings are not sensitive to potential endogeneity or 
autocorrelation issues.15 All of the robustness checks show qualitatively similar results to our 
main findings as reported in Tables 3 and 4.   
                                                 
15 The system GMM is based on two equations, that is, the “level” and “difference” equations, and uses lagged 
differences and levels as instrumental variables (IVs) to estimate the level and difference equations, respectively. 
The system GMM estimators need to pass two specification tests for the selected IVs to be statistically valid: (1) 
Hansen’s J test and (2) the difference-in-Hansen test. In addition, the system GMM estimators need to pass AR(1) 
and AR(2) serial correlation tests using the first-differenced residuals to indicate that the original error terms are not 
serially correlated. If the original error terms in the level equation are not serially correlated, the AR(1) test should 
be significant, whereas the AR(2) test should be insignificant. The far-right column for the system GMM in Table 5 
demonstrates that the system GMM estimators passed all of these specification tests. 
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5. Discussion and conclusion 
5.1 Summary of empirical findings 
Using an unbalanced panel with a sample of 3,592 subsidiaries established by 799 MNEs 
operating in 59 countries from 1996 to 2010 (with a total of 18,252 subsidiary-year cases), we 
analyze the effects of heterogeneous FDI “motivations” as revealed by the MNEs on the 
relationships between various types of outbound FDI and the MNEs’ domestic employment 
levels. Overall, our 3SLS estimation results indicate three conclusions. First, outbound FDI 
projects motivated by (1) market seeking for scale and scope expansion, (2) natural resource 
seeking, or (3) strategic asset seeking tend to boost domestic employment by MNEs (i.e., 
strategic complements). Second, outbound FDI projects motivated by (4) market seeking 
associated with declining domestic demand or (5) labor resource seeking reduce domestic 
employment by MNEs (i.e., strategic substitutes). Finally, across the range of motivations, 
outbound FDI motivation tends to have a greater impact on domestic employment when the 
MNEs have strong resource commitments or control over their subsidiaries in the form of 
majority ownership. 
These empirical findings imply that “motivations” are endogenous to MNEs’ strategic 
decisions about outbound FDI (Makino, Lau & Yeh, 2002), and, hence, could lead to variations 
in the FDI outcomes even under similar country-specific conditions. Most mainstream IB studies 
explore a variety of conditions leading to variations in firm behavior and performance; for 
example, Michael Porter’s national diamond and five forces framework, John Dunning’s 
Ownership-Location-Internalization (OLI) framework of FDI, and Jay Barney’s Valuable-Rare-
Inimitable-Nonsubstitutable (VRIN) resources framework. These frameworks, while popular, 
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allow little room for researchers to explore different motivations that lead to variations in MNE 
behavior. As such, the empirical results from this current study highlight the value of examining 
the motivations of outbound FDI using firm-level data that should complement the conventional 
FDI research stream that pays limited attention to firm heterogeneity in analyzing the effect of 
FDI on MNEs’ performance/outcomes such as domestic employment. 
 
5.2 Contribution to the IB literature 
The association between outbound FDI and domestic employment has been discussed in terms of 
three issues: (i) whether production by the foreign affiliates of MNEs serves as a substitute or a 
complement to home country production by the parent MNEs (or by other home country firms); 
(ii) how FDI activities affect the domestic employment structure and the wage differences in a 
home country; and (iii) how FDI activities affect the labor intensity of home production (Mariotti, 
Mutinelli, & Piscitello, 2003, p. 420). Our study focuses on the first aspect of the FDI-
employment relationship by examining whether and how MNEs’ motivations for launching 
outbound FDIs (resulting in the establishment of foreign subsidiaries) increase or decrease their 
domestic employment levels. Our study makes three main contributions to the previous literature. 
First, our study underscores the importance of firm heterogeneity in the determination of 
domestic employment levels by MNEs, thereby providing insight into an issue that has been 
relatively neglected in the previous international trade and investment literature. Major studies in 
international economics (with a primary focus on the horizontal vs. vertical roles of CSAs in 
trade and FDI) have paid very limited attention to the roles of FSAs in affecting the outbound 
FDI decisions of MNEs, which may in turn affect their decisions regarding employment at home. 
Our study integrates MNEs’ configuring their FSAs through FDI (i.e., exploitation vs. 
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exploration) with the traditional discussions on horizontal vs. vertical FDI for configuring CSAs. 
Furthermore, our study examines whether and how certain motivations for outbound FDI 
projects are likely to increase or decrease domestic employment by MNEs. The key thrust of this 
study is that FDI is a self-selecting behavior, and MNEs possess different motivations for 
conducting FDI. Among the primary FDI motivations suggested by Dunning (1998), we show 
that the motivations of market seeking (for scale and scope expansion), natural resource seeking, 
and strategic asset seeking in host countries all serve to aggregate or create FSAs in foreign 
markets, thereby leading to stronger “competitive advantages” for MNEs. As a result, outbound 
FDI projects conducted for these motives are expected to expand foreign markets, resulting in 
increased domestic employment by MNEs. Conversely, the motivations of market seeking 
associated with declines in domestic demand and of labor resource seeking aim to exploit the 
“comparative advantages” of foreign subsidiary nations during the course of FSA arbitrage, so 
that MNEs can obtain access to growing foreign markets and more efficient foreign labor 
resources. Therefore, outbound FDI projects implemented under these motivations aim to 
vertically relocate segments of MNE manufacturing to host countries, thereby, reducing the 
MNEs’ domestic employment.   
Second, the integration of heterogeneous FSAs into the traditional CSA configuration 
helps to disentangle underlying mechanisms in the relationships between certain FDI motivations 
and domestic employment by MNEs. For example, conventional studies in international 
economics commonly fail to differentiate between market-seeking FDI for the sake of scale and 
scope expansion (i.e., Cell I in Figure 1) and market-seeking FDI to substitute for declines in 
domestic markets (i.e., Cell IV in Figure 1). In addition, conventional studies often fail to 
consider the different effects that (natural) resource-seeking FDI (i.e., Cell II in Figure 1) and 
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strategic-asset-seeking FDI (i.e., Cell III and VI in Figure 1) have on domestic employment by 
MNEs. By incorporating insights on heterogeneous FSAs from the field of international business 
studies into the traditional discussions on the horizontal vs. vertical roles of CSAs, our study puts 
forward a solid conceptual framework that can explain cases not previously investigated in 
conventional international economics studies. 
 Third, by expanding the traditional FSAs-CSAs framework through the perspective of 
MNE heterogeneity, our study provides a solid theoretical foundation on which we can predict 
MNEs’ optimal allocations of scarce human resources across national borders in the form of their 
decisions regarding domestic employment. As has been highlighted in the recently developed 
resources/capabilities-based view of MNEs (Pitelis & Teece, 2010), human resources and 
capabilities are among the substantial assets that can be easily and successfully scaled by MNEs 
across national borders. The optimal employment decisions of MNEs are normally focused on 
their headquarters-subsidiary structures, and these decisions can be effectively leveraged intra-
firm between the home and host country branches of MNEs. 
 
5.3 Contribution to practice and policy 
This study also provides important practical implications for both managers of MNEs and public 
policymakers, both of whom are concerned with the possible economic and social impacts of 
reduced domestic employment following the relocation of production bases. As discussed earlier, 
our study shows that certain types of outbound FDI can have negative effects on domestic 
employment, especially when the FDI is aimed toward seeking low-cost labor or finding new 
markets associated with declining home demand. However, our findings also show that the other 
types of outbound FDI usually have a positive impact on domestic employment. This evidence 
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also suggests that even in cases with negative effects, MNEs can reduce the harmful impact on 
domestic markets by making parallel FDI efforts that enhance domestic employment. Such 
concurrent approaches may help MNEs maintain their business “legitimacy” among the people 
of their home countries. MNEs that seek to aggregate or create FSAs using either horizontal or 
vertical FDIs tend to increase domestic employment to a significant extent, as these investments 
serve to increase demand from expanded foreign markets. Making such investments is important 
for not only maintaining domestic employment levels, but also helping domestic firms expand 
and gain international competitive advantages. These expanding firms can “endogenize” their 
CSAs and build their own FSAs, thereby increasing their domestic employment. 
 
5.4 Limitations and future research direction 
This study has several limitations, which suggest directions for future research. First, due to the 
limited information provided by the Japanese FDI dataset, we examine only total counts of 
employees, without specifying employment levels (management vs. non-management), worker 
types (white-collar vs. blue-collar), or status (full-time vs. part-time). This data limitation may 
generate an aggregating bias in our empirical evidence, as other observations have indicated that 
outward FDI increases managerial jobs but reduces blue-collar jobs at home. Our generalized 
information may blur the real substitutional effects between competing groups of employees 
within MNEs, as it only shows whether total domestic employment declines as a result of the 
outbound FDI. Furthermore, since the dataset is compiled based on annual survey, there may be 
missing observations, missing values, and/or entry errors in the data which generate potential 
bias in statistical analyses. While prior studies have suggested that the data are generally reliable 
and trustworthy (Isobe, Makino, & Montgomery, 2000; Delios & Beamish, 2001), further 
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research is needed to verify that such bias does not affect the interpretations of the empirical 
results. Second, we acknowledge that the motivations for investment in subsidiaries may change 
over time as the subsidiaries develop. Such changes in motivation can encourage MNEs to 
consider “relocations” of subsidiaries (Makino & Tsang, 2011), resulting in subsequent changes 
in employment among the multiple subsidiaries and headquarters of MNEs. As our study focuses 
on domestic employment by MNEs that pursue outbound FDI, we do not consider potential 
changes in employment among foreign subsidiaries after their initial entry that may be affected 
by the various motivations for outbound FDI. Third, some MNEs may have multiple motivations 
for direct investment in foreign countries. As such, the net effects that differing motivations for 
outbound FDI have on the parent MNEs’ domestic employment levels may be blurred. Thus, we 
need more in-depth investigations along this line. Fourth, although we attempt to control for 
unobserved fixed effects by including industry dummies of Japanese parent MNEs ( ), 
regional dummies of their host countries ( ), and yearly dummies ( ) in our empirical 
estimations, we acknowledge that we do not control for all of the factors that may potentially 
influence the outcome variable in our study. Lastly, our study is based on a sample of MNEs 
from a single country, Japan. Clearly, our conceptual discussions on the relationship between 
outbound FDI motivations and domestic employment by MNEs should also be applied and 
extended to other country contexts. We hope others will join us in this line of research, as it 
opens a new avenue for rich inquiry regarding MNE strategies, FDI motivations, and the growth 
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* Among the four FDI motives suggested by Dunning (1998), we remove the efficiency-
seeking FDI motivation and focus on market-seeking, resource-seeking (natural or labor 
resources), and strategic-asset-seeking FDI motivations in the conceptual framework. 
Efficiency seeking can be achieved by combining some or all of the other FDI motivations, 
which implies the existence of inconclusive confounding effects of the efficiency-seeking 
FDI motivation on MNEs’ domestic employment. 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual framework       
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics  
     
 Full sample         Ownership ≥ 50% 
          
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
          
1. Japanese parent MNE employment (ln) 8.495 1.396 8.477 1.406 
     
2. Overseas subsidiary employment (ln) 3.831 1.699 3.710 1.665 
     
3. Host country GDP (ln) 27.558 1.677 27.684 1.682 
     
4. Ratio of Japanese GDP by industry (%) 9.387 6.464 9.882 6.370 
     
5. Unemployment rate in Japan (%) 4.604 0.518 4.603 0.517 
     
6. Distance between Japan and host countries (ln) 32.905 31.987 35.540 32.596 
     
7. Host country rule of law 0.942 0.820 1.028 0.801 
     
8. Parent MNE local networks (ln) 0.477 0.664 0.465 0.652 
     
9. Parent MNE R&D ratio (%) 0.023 0.028 0.024 0.029 
     
10. Overseas subsidiary revenue (ln) 9.380 1.988 9.377 1.991 
     
11. MD1. Building international networks of distribution 0.073 0.261 0.079 0.269 
     
12. MD2. Market access 0.727 0.446 0.729 0.445 
     
13. MD3. Exports to other countries 0.036 0.186 0.037 0.188 
     
14. MD4. Controls business of the area 0.013 0.113 0.014 0.117 
     
15. MD5. Alliance with customers in Japan 0.020 0.140 0.021 0.142 
     
16. MD6. Labor intensity 0.096 0.295 0.095 0.293 
     
17. MD7. Exports to Japan 0.018 0.133 0.019 0.137 
     
18. MD8. Building international networks of production 0.180 0.384 0.165 0.371 
     
19. MD9. Natural resources, materials 0.021 0.144 0.021 0.143 
     
20. MD10. Information gathering, royalty revenue 0.187 0.390 0.196 0.397 
     
21. MD11. R&D 0.028 0.164 0.030 0.170 
     
22. MD12. Tax breaks for investment 0.033 0.180 0.029 0.169 
     
23. MD13. Financing, currency hedging 0.011 0.105 0.012 0.108 
     
24. MD14. Trade conflict 0.011 0.103 0.012 0.110 
     
25. MD15. Building new business 0.015 0.121 0.016 0.124 
     
Notes. a. N = 10,094 for the full sample, and 8,712 for the subsample of Japanese MNEs with majority equity 





Table 2. Correlation matrix for full sample 
                         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
                         
                         
1 1.00                        
                         
2 0.33*** 1.00                       
                         
3 -0.11*** -0.07*** 1.00                      
                         
4 -0.03*** -0.46*** 0.12*** 1.00                     
                         
5 0.01 -0.01 -0.06*** -0.01 1.00                    
                         
6 -0.001 -0.18*** 0.67*** 0.23*** -0.001 1.00                   
                         
7 0.003 -0.36*** 0.22*** 0.35*** 0.01 0.60*** 1.00                  
                         
8 0.37*** 0.19*** 0.24*** -0.12*** -0.01 0.01 -0.18*** 1.00                 
                         
9 -0.03*** -0.04*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.06*** 0.09*** 0.07*** -0.02* 1.00                
                         
10 0.40*** 0.54*** 0.08*** -0.08*** -0.02** 0.15*** 0.18*** 0.12*** 0.04*** 1.00               
                         
11 -0.12*** -0.17*** -0.01 0.17*** -0.01 -0.02** 0.01 -0.08*** -0.004 -0.06*** 1.00              
                         
12 -0.03** -0.09*** 0.08*** 0.16*** 0.004 0.08*** 0.13*** -0.11*** 0.02 0.06*** -0.13*** 1.00             
                         
13 0.01 0.02 -0.10*** -0.03*** 0.004 -0.08*** -0.005 0.004 -0.01 0.02** 0.003 -0.08*** 1.00            
                         
14 0.02 -0.07*** -0.02* 0.03*** 0.01 0.02* 0.07*** 0.02** 0.02** 0.005 -0.005 -0.03*** -0.02* 1.00           
                         
15 -0.05*** 0.03*** 0.01 -0.06*** 0.01 -0.001 -0.02** 0.01 0.02** -0.02** -0.03*** -0.07*** -0.03*** -0.02* 1.00          
                         
16 0.06*** 0.26*** -0.18*** -0.21*** -0.004 -0.24*** -0.26*** 0.06*** 0.02** 0.03*** -0.09*** -0.21*** 0.06*** -0.03*** -0.04*** 1.00         
                         
17 0.01 0.07*** -0.03*** -0.08*** 0.01 -0.07*** -0.13*** 0.08*** -0.02** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.13*** -0.01 -0.02 -0.02* 0.08*** 1.00        
                         
18 0.02** 0.29*** -0.05*** -0.43*** -0.0002 -0.17*** -0.30*** 0.11*** -0.06*** 0.01 -0.07*** -0.28*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.03*** -0.05*** 0.02** 1.00       
                         
19 0.01 -0.06*** -0.03*** -0.07*** 0.01 -0.02** 0.03*** 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.03*** -0.18*** -0.03*** -0.02* -0.02** 0.01 0.001 -0.01 1.00      
          ***               
20 0.01 -0.24*** 0.12*** 0.30*** -0.001 0.20*** 0.21*** -0.08*** 0.003 -0.04*** -0.10*** 0.08*** -0.07*** -0.03*** -0.05*** -0.15*** -0.06*** -0.21*** -0.004 1.00     
          *               
21 -0.004 -0.06*** 0.12*** 0.15*** -0.01 0.08*** 0.02** 0.08*** 0.10*** -0.13*** -0.05*** -0.22*** -0.03*** -0.02* -0.02** -0.05*** -0.02** -0.04*** -0.02** 0.02 1.00    
                         
22 0.06*** 0.17*** -0.10*** -0.16*** 0.01 -0.08*** -0.06*** 0.02* -0.02** 0.08*** -0.05*** -0.10*** -0.03*** -0.02** -0.03*** 0.13*** -0.03** -0.09*** -0.03*** -0.08*** -0.03*** 1.00   
                         
23 0.07*** -0.17*** -0.03** -0.03*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.08*** 0.04*** 0.001 -0.07*** -0.03*** -0.14*** -0.02** -0.01 -0.01 -0.03*** -0.01 -0.05*** -0.02 -0.03*** -0.02* -0.01 1.00  
                         
24 0.02** 0.08*** 0.04*** -0.09*** 0.001 0.08*** 0.05*** -0.01 -0.04*** 0.07*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.02** -0.01 -0.001 -0.02** -0.01 -0.05*** -0.02 -0.05*** -0.02* 0.06*** -0.01 1.00 
                         
25 -0.07*** -0.05*** 0.01 0.01 -0.0003 -0.01 0.0004 -0.02** 0.02* -0.05*** -0.03** -0.11*** -0.02** -0.01 -0.02 -0.04*** 0.02* -0.04*** 0.01 -0.03*** 0.02* -0.02** -0.01 -0.01 
                         
Notes. a. N = 10,094. b. Significance levels: * p  0.10, ** p  0.05, *** p  0.01. c. 1. Japanese parent MNE employment (ln); 2. Overseas subsidiary employment (ln); 3. Host country GDP (ln); 4. Ratio of Japanese GDP by industry (%); 5. 
Unemployment rate in Japan (%); 6. Distance between Japan and host countries (ln); 7. Rule of law; 8. Parent MNE local networks (ln); 9. Parent MNE R&D ratio (%); 10. Overseas subsidiary revenue (ln); 11. MD1. Building international 
networks of distribution; 12. MD2. Market access; 13. MD3. Exports to other countries; 14. MD4. Controls business of the area; 15. MD5. Alliance with customers in Japan; 16. MD6. Labor intensity; 17. MD7. Exports to Japan; 18. MD8. 
Building international networks of production; 19. MD9. Natural resources, materials; 20. MD10. Information gathering, royalty revenue; 21. MD11. R&D; 22. MD12. Tax breaks for investment; 23. MD13. Financing, currency hedging; 24. 




Table 3. 3SLS regression results: Full sample 
       
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3               

















equation               
Overseas subsidiary employment (ln) 0.535*** [0.013]  0.539*** [0.013]  0.538*** [0.013]  
       
Parent MNE employment (ln)  -0.525 [0.609]  -0.389 [0.660]  -0.452 [0.665] 
       
Host country GDP (ln) -0.222*** [0.014] -0.198 [0.157] -0.234*** [0.014] -0.151 [0.174] -0.235*** [0.014] -0.166 [0.175] 
       
Ratio of Japanese GDP by industry (%) 0.023 [0.019] -0.039** [0.020] 0.033* [0.018] -0.037* [0.019] 0.045*** [0.019] -0.055*** [0.020] 
       
Unemployment rate in Japan (%) 2.279*** [0.144] 1.755 [1.604] 2.248*** [0.143] 1.439 [1.755] 2.233*** [0.143] 1.663 [1.768] 
       
Distance between Japan and host countries (ln) 0.0004 [0.002] 0.006** [0.003] 0.001 [0.002] 0.006** [0.003] 0.001 [0.002] 0.006** [0.003] 
       
Host country rule of law 0.277*** [0.023] -0.751*** [0.064] 0.253*** [0.023] -0.692*** [0.069] 0.253*** [0.023] -0.693*** [0.068] 
       
Parent MNE local networks (ln) 0.798*** [0.020] 0.544 [0.519] 0.813*** [0.019] 0.406 [0.564] 0.817*** [0.020] 0.462 [0.571] 
       
Parent MNE R&D ratio (%) -0.957*** [0.431]  -0.767* [0.431]  -0.806* [0.431]  
       
Overseas subsidiary revenue (ln)  0.619*** [0.158]  0.571*** [0.168]  0.587*** [0.169] 
       
I. Market-seeking FDI (Domestic market expansion)       
       
MD1. Building international networks of distribution   -0.005 [0.049] -0.510*** [0.159] 0.181 [0.154] -0.804*** [0.209] 
       
MD2. Market access   0.146*** [0.034] 0.091 [0.111] 0.268*** [0.048] -0.103 [0.124] 
       
MD3. Export to other countries   0.059 [0.064] -0.094 [0.062] 0.246** [0.107] 0.320 [0.247] 
       
MD4. Controls business of the area   0.230** [0.104] -0.664*** [0.123] 0.542*** [0.206] -1.762*** [0.301] 
       
II. Market-seeking FDI (Domestic demand decline)              
MD5. Alliance with customers in Japan   -0.449*** [0.084] -0.119 [0.295] -0.449*** [0.084] -0.130 [0.293] 
       
MD1. Building international networks of distribution ×  
Ratio of Japanese GDP by industry (%) 
    -0.017 [0.011] 0.025** [0.011] 
       
MD2. Market access ×  
Ratio of Japanese GDP by industry (%) 
    -0.016*** [0.004] 0.025*** [0.004] 
       
MD3. Export to other countries ×  
Ratio of Japanese GDP by industry (%) 
    -0.023** [0.010] -0.045* [0.027] 
       
MD4. Controls business of the area ×  
Ratio of Japanese GDP by industry (%) 
    -0.029* [0.016] 0.098*** [0.020] 
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III. Labor-seeking FDI              
MD6. Labor intensity   -0.160*** [0.046] 0.353*** [0.047] -0.145*** [0.046] 0.342*** [0.049] 
       
MD7. Exports to Japan   -0.048 [0.089] 0.136 [0.088] -0.026 [0.089] 0.091 [0.090] 
       
MD8. Building international networks of production   -0.006 [0.040] 0.171*** [0.062] 0.025 [0.041] 0.148** [0.070] 
       
IV. Natural-resource-seeking FDI              
MD9. Natural resources, materials   0.116 [0.090] -0.653*** [0.157] 0.124 [0.089] -0.679*** [0.159] 
       
V. Strategic-asset-seeking FDI       
       
MD10. Information gathering, royalty revenue   0.314*** [0.033] -0.252** [0.103] 0.311*** [0.033] -0.250** [0.100] 
       
MD11. R&D   0.121 [0.080] 0.092 [0.116] 0.070 [0.081] 0.174 [0.114] 
       
VI. Other FDI motivations              
MD12. Tax breaks for investment    -0.092 [0.069] 0.335*** [0.083] -0.067 [0.069] 0.317*** [0.088] 
       
MD13. Financing, currency hedging   0.439** [0.178] -0.755*** [0.174] 0.442** [0.178] -0.772*** [0.178] 
       
MD14. Trade conflict   0.0005 [0.113] 0.139 [0.119] 0.026 [0.113] 0.113 [0.124] 
       
MD15. Building new business   -0.202** [0.097] -0.345 [0.234] -0.222** [0.098] -0.331 [0.237] 
       
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
R2  0.330 0.495 0.341 0.579 0.343 0.556 
       
χ2  56,342.3*** 114,899.3*** 573,737.5*** 138,303.2*** 575,168.0*** 131,176.7***               
Notes. a. N = 10,094. b. Significance levels: * p  0.10, ** p  0.05, *** p  0.01. c. Numbers in [ ] are standardized errors. d. Year fixed effects: 1996–2010. e. Regional fixed effects: Asia; 
Middle East; Europe; North America; Latin America; Africa; Oceania. f. Industry fixed effects: Agriculture, forestry, and fishing; Mining; Food products and beverages; Textiles; Pulp, 
paper, and paper products; Chemicals; Petroleum and coal products; Non-metallic mineral products; Iron and steel; Fabricated metal products; Machinery; Electrical machinery, equipment, 
and supplies; Transport equipment; Precision instruments; Manufacturing others; Construction; Electricity, gas, and water supply; Wholesale and retail trade; Finance and insurance; Real 
estate; Transport and communications; Service activities.   
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Table 4. 3SLS regression results: Subsample with ownership ≥ 50% 
       
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3               

















equation               
Overseas subsidiary employment (ln) 0.555*** [0.015]  0.562*** [0.016]  0.558*** [0.016]  
       
Parent MNE employment (ln)  -0.406 [0.348]  -0.210 [0.306]  -0.207 [0.297] 
       
Host country GDP (ln) -0.191*** [0.016] -0.208** [0.089] -0.204*** [0.016] -0.148* [0.080] -0.205*** [0.016] -0.147 [0.078]* 
       
Ratio of Japanese GDP by industry (%) 0.034* [0.021] -0.028 [0.021] 0.046** [0.021] -0.034* [0.019] 0.063*** [0.021] -0.050** [0.020] 
       
Unemployment rate in Japan (%) 1.919*** [0.189] 1.536* [0.876] 1.950*** [0.188] 1.396* [0.758] 1.926*** [0.187] 1.049 [0.737] 
       
Distance between Japan and host countries (ln) 0.001 [0.002] 0.003 [0.002] 0.001 [0.002] 0.002 [0.002] 0.002 [0.002] 0.002 [0.002] 
       
Host country rule of law 0.297*** [0.026] -0.796*** [0.048] 0.256*** [0.027] -0.720*** [0.046] 0.254*** [0.027] -0.713*** [0.044] 
       
Parent MNE local networks (ln) 0.784*** [0.022] 0.513* [0.305] 0.797*** [0.022] 0.313 [0.267] 0.804*** [0.022] 0.311 [0.261] 
       
Parent MNE R&D ratio (%) -1.550*** [0.448]  -1.442*** [0.446]  -1.479*** [0.446]  
       
Overseas subsidiary revenue (ln)  0.560*** [0.089]  0.496*** [0.076]  0.495*** [0.074] 
       
I. Market-seeking FDI (Domestic market expansion)                     
MD1. Building international networks of distribution   0.023 [0.052] -0.450*** [0.077] 0.248 [0.169] -0.697*** [0.155] 
       
MD2. Market access   0.168*** [0.037] 0.094 [0.069] 0.357*** [0.054] -0.079 [0.096] 
       
MD3. Export to other countries   0.195*** [0.069] -0.143** [0.069] 0.561*** [0.121] 0.110 [0.196] 
       
MD4. Controls business of the area   0.397*** [0.110] -0.532*** [0.100] 1.154*** [0.236] -1.690*** [0.214] 
       
II. Market-seeking FDI (Domestic demand decline)       
       
MD5. Alliance with customers in Japan   -0.507*** [0.090] -0.017 [0.165] -0.500*** [0.090] -0.011 [0.159] 
       
MD1. Building international networks of distribution ×  
Ratio of Japanese GDP by industry (%) 
    -0.020* [0.012] 0.022** [0.011] 
       
MD2. Market access ×  
Ratio of Japanese GDP by industry (%) 
    -0.023*** [0.005] 0.020*** [0.005] 
       
MD3. Export to other countries ×  
Ratio of Japanese GDP by industry (%) 
    -0.042*** [0.011] -0.026 [0.028] 
       
MD4. Controls business of the area ×  
Ratio of Japanese GDP by industry (%) 
    -0.065*** [0.017] 0.096*** [0.015] 
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III. Labor-seeking FDI       
       
MD6. Labor intensity   -0.156*** [0.051] 0.443*** [0.050] -0.128** [0.051] 0.428*** [0.052] 
       
MD7. Exports to Japan   -0.003 [0.094] 0.168* [0.087] 0.033 [0.094] 0.129 [0.087] 
       
MD8. Building international networks of production   -0.043 [0.045] 0.175*** [0.043] 0.009 [0.045] 0.148** [0.047] 
       
IV. Natural-resource-seeking FDI       
       
MD9. Natural resources, materials   0.330*** [0.097] -0731*** [0.089] 0.336*** [0.097] -0.743*** [0.088] 
       
V. Strategic-asset-seeking FDI       
       
MD10. Information gathering, royalty revenue   0.398*** [0.035] -0.318*** [0.068] 0.392*** [0.035] -0.322*** [0.065] 
       
MD11. R&D   0.166** [0.084] 0.193* [0.101] 0.102 [0.085] 0.240*** [0.094] 
       
VI. Other FDI motivations       
       
MD12. Tax breaks for investment    -0.067 [0.079] 0.469*** [0.089] -0.024 [0.079] 0.439*** [0.092] 
       
MD13. Financing, currency hedging   0.768*** [0.201] -0.844*** [0.193] 0.777*** [0.201] -0.869*** [0.191] 
       
MD14. Trade conflict   -0.008 [0.117] 0.163 [0.106] 0.041 [0.117] 0.129 [0.108] 
       
MD15. Building new business   -0.110 [0.104] -0.243** [0.114] -0.135 [0.103] -0.218* [0.115] 
       
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
R2  0.324 0.535 0.341 0.632 0.346 0.636 
       
χ2  473,257.8*** 105,124.3*** 485,639.4*** 133,443.5*** 489,212.8*** 134,934.8***               
Notes. a. N = 8,712. b. Significance levels: * p  0.10, ** p  0.05, *** p  0.01. c. Numbers in [ ] are standardized errors. d. Year fixed effects: 1996–2010. e. Regional fixed effects: Asia; 
Middle East; Europe; North America; Latin America; Africa; Oceania. f. Industry fixed effects: Agriculture, forestry, and fishing; Mining; Food products and beverages; Textiles; Pulp, 
paper, and paper products; Chemicals; Petroleum and coal products; Non-metallic mineral products; Iron and steel; Fabricated metal products; Machinery; Electrical machinery, equipment, 
and supplies; Transport equipment; Precision instruments; Manufacturing others; Construction; Electricity, gas, and water supply; Wholesale and retail trade; Finance and insurance; Real 





Table 5. Summary of Empirical Results and Hypothesis Testing  
Hypothesis Outbound FDI Motivation Empirical Evidence 
H1  Market-seeking FDI (+) 
   -  Scale expansion 
   -  Scope expansion 
Partially Supported 
H2  Market-seeking FDI (-) 
   - Associated with domestic demand decline 
Supported 
H3  Labor-seeking FDI (-) 
   - Replacement of inefficient domestic labor forces 
Partially Supported 
H4  Natural-resource-seeking FDI (+) 
   - Access to scarce and immobile foreign endowment of natural 
resources 
Partially Supported 
H5  Strategic-asset-seeking FDI (+) 
   -  Home-base-exploiting R&D activities 






Table 6. Robustness Test Results (Ownership ≥ 50%, Parent MNE Equation)  
       
 Parent MNE 
employment 
 at (t+1) 
Parent MNE 
employment 











              
Overseas subsidiary employment (ln) 0.757*** [0.017] 0.746*** [0.018] 0.752*** [0.020] 0.569*** [0.021] 0.577*** [0.021] 0.148*** [0.019] 
       
Host country GDP (ln) -0.149*** [0.018] -0.129*** [0.019] -0.102*** [0.021] -0.141*** [0.020] -0.297*** [0.023] -0.030 [0.020] 
       
Ratio of Japanese GDP by industry (%) 0.062** [0.024] 0.075*** [0.026] 0.080*** [0.029] 0.137*** [0.029] 0.050* [0.029] 0.014** [0.006] 
       
Unemployment rate in Japan (%) 1.370*** [0.225] 1.289*** [0.277] 1.180*** [0.280] 1.556*** [0.201] 2.272*** [0.268] -0.582 [0.377] 
       
Distance between Japan and host countries (ln) 0.001 [0.002] 0.001 [0.002] 0.001 [0.002] 0.00003 [0.002] -0.007** [0.003] 0.030*** [0.008] 
       
Host country rule of law 0.377*** [0.030] 0.374*** [0.032] 0.393*** [0.034] 0.184*** [0.035] 0.156*** [0.039] 0.078*** [0.022] 
       
Parent MNE local networks (ln) 0.708*** [0.025] 0.709*** [0.026] 0.710*** [0.028]  0.908*** [0.031] 0.441*** [0.043] 
       
Parent MNE R&D ratio (%) -0.406 [0.425] -0.056 [0.467] 0.101 [0.515] -2.726*** [0.563] -2.583*** [0.712] -2.537*** [0.435] 
       
I. Market-seeking FDI (Domestic market expansion)                     
MD1. Building international networks of distribution 0.340* [0.194] 0.415** [0.206] 0.400* [0.221] 0.411* [0.231] 1.572*** [0.461] 0.063 [0.191] 
       
MD2. Market access 0.345*** [0.062] 0.341*** [0.065] 0.344*** [0.069] 0.555*** [0.081] 0.394*** [0.139] -0.304 [0.197] 
       
MD3. Export to other countries 0.521*** [0.138] 0.578*** [0.144] 0.540*** [0.154] 1.001*** [0.173] -0.892 [0.665] 0.657*** [0.210] 
       
MD4. Controls business of the area 1.469*** [0.266] 1.472*** [0.279] 1.336*** [0.303] 1.200*** [0.333] 1.229*** [0.439] 0.347 [0.341] 
       
II. Market-seeking FDI (Domestic demand decline)       
       
MD5. Alliance with customers in Japan -0.504*** [0.105] -0.493*** [0.113] -0.475*** [0.122] -0.430*** [0.131] -0.652*** [0.199] -0.991 [0.780] 
       
MD1. Building international networks of distribution ×  
Ratio of Japanese GDP by industry (%) 
-0.018 [0.014] -0.022 [0.015] -0.022 [0.016] -0.029* [0.016] -0.086*** [0.032] -0.044*** [0.008] 
       
MD2. Market access ×  
Ratio of Japanese GDP by industry (%) 
-0.024*** [0.005] -0.023*** [0.006] -0.024*** [0.006] -0.039*** [0.007] -0.018** [0.009] -0.013* [0.007] 
       
MD3. Export to other countries ×  
Ratio of Japanese GDP by industry (%) 
-0.036*** [0.012] -0.043*** [0.013] -0.043*** [0.014] -0.075*** [0.016] -0.044 [0.052] -0.064*** [0.013] 
       
MD4. Controls business of the area ×  
Ratio of Japanese GDP by industry (%) 
-0.082*** [0.019] -0.082*** [0.020] -0.074*** [0.022] -0.039 [0.024] -0.101*** [0.037] -0.032** [0.014] 
       
III. Labor-seeking FDI       
       
MD6. Labor intensity -0.262*** [0.058] -0.270*** [0.060] -0.300*** [0.063] 0.170** [0.076] -0.009 [0.159] -0.868*** [0.308] 
       
MD7. Exports to Japan 0.064 [0.104] 0.104 [0.106] 0.099 [0.111] 0.282* [0.168] 0.339 [0.251] 0.104 [0.550] 
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MD8. Building international networks of production -0.022 [0.051] -0.008 [0.054] -0.010 [0.057] 0.098 [0.064] -0.014 [0.134] -0.880*** [0.247] 
       
IV. Natural-resource-seeking FDI       
       
MD9. Natural resources, materials 0.435*** [0.111] 0.434*** [0.116] 0.298** [0.124] 0.088 [0.130] 0.675*** [0.205] 2.119** [1.034] 
       
V. Strategic-asset-seeking FDI       
       
MD10. Information gathering, royalty revenue 0.471*** [0.040] 0.465*** [0.041] 0.443*** [0.043] 0.399*** [0.045] 0.804*** [0.159] -0.079 [0.291] 
       
MD11. R&D 0.158 [0.098] 0.186* [0.102] 0.189* [0.110] 0.286** [0.129] 0.438*** [0.167] -0.519 [0.332] 
       
VI. Other FDI motivations       
       
MD12. Tax breaks for investment -0.205** [0.089] -0.212** [0.093] -0.228** [0.099] 0.039 [0.110] 0.733*** [0.265] 3.046*** [0.847] 
       
MD13. Financing, currency hedging 1.013*** [0.222] 0.918*** [0.235] 0.940*** [0.250] 0.548* [0.329] 1.168*** [0.341] 1.603** [0.634] 
       
MD14. Trade conflict -0.097 [0.131] -0.114 [0.133] -0.220 [0.142] 0.379*** [0.144] -0.567* [0.329] 2.366** [1.114] 
       
MD15. Building new business -0.066 [0.123] -0.094 [0.135] -0.217 [0.153] -0.124 [0.135] -0.475** [0.194] 0.328 [0.818] 
       
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Number of observations 7,827 7,045 6,252 5,087 4,391 15,899 
       
R2 0.243 0.248 0.254 0.246 0.387  
       
χ2 389,128.6*** 361,581.2*** 325,123.4*** 258,439.9*** 245,135.0*** 26.88*** 
       
Number of instruments      441 
       
Hansen’s J test (p-value)      0.316 
       
Difference-in-Hansen test (p-value)      0.975 
       
AR(1) test in differences (p-value)      0.019 
       
AR(2) test in differences (p-value)      0.243 
                     
Notes. a. Significance levels: * p  0.10, ** p  0.05, *** p  0.01. b. Numbers in [ ] are standardized errors. c. Year fixed effects: 1996–2010. d. Regional fixed effects: Asia; Middle East; 
Europe; North America; Latin America; Africa; Oceania. e. Industry fixed effects: Agriculture, forestry, and fishing; Mining; Food products and beverages; Textiles; Pulp, paper, and paper 
products; Chemicals; Petroleum and coal products; Non-metallic mineral products; Iron and steel; Fabricated metal products; Machinery; Electrical machinery, equipment, and supplies; 
Transport equipment; Precision instruments; Manufacturing others; Construction; Electricity, gas, and water supply; Wholesale and retail trade; Finance and insurance; Real estate; Transport 
and communications; Service activities.  
 
 
